We study a procurement setting in which the buyer seeks a low price but will not allocate the contract to a supplier who has not passed qualification screening. Qualification screening is costly for the buyer, involving product tests, site visits, and interviews. In addition to a qualified incumbent supplier, the buyer has an entrant of unknown qualification. The buyer wishes to run a price-only, open-descending reverse auction between the incumbent and the entrant, and faces a strategic choice about whether to perform qualification screening on the entrant before or after the auction. We analytically study the buyer's optimal strategy, accounting for the fact that under post-auction qualification the incumbent knows he could lose the auction but still win the contract. In our analysis we derive the incumbent's optimal bidding strategy under post-auction qualification and find that it follows a threshold structure in which high-cost incumbents hold back on bidding -or even boycott the auction -in order to preserve their profit margin, and only lower-cost incumbents bid to win. These results are strikingly different from the usual opendescending auction analysis where all bidders are fully qualified and bidding to win is always a dominant strategy. We test our analytical results in the laboratory, with human subjects.
Introduction
Procurement is important -the average US manufacturer spends roughly 60% of its revenue pur-
chasing goods and services (U.S. Department of Commerce 2005). Competitive bidding (auctions)
is a powerful tool that many buyers deploy to manage spend. Seeking price concessions from their incumbent suppliers, it is common for buyers to have a highly motivated new (entrant) supplier compete in a reverse auction against the incumbent supplier when the incumbent's contract is up for renewal.
While contract price is a concern, buyers generally will not switch the contract to an entrant unless the entrant has been verified to be fully qualified for the business. As is common in industry, we refer to performing qualification screening on a supplier as the act of verifying that the supplier is indeed able to comply with all the contract specifications (e.g., on product, delivery, packaging) with a reasonable degree of certainty. The process of screening an entrant's qualifications is costly for the buyer, and can include testing the entrant's products, visiting the entrant's production facilities, verifying the entrant's surge capacity availability, etc.
When it comes to screening an entrant's qualifications, the buyer has a strategic choice: attempt to qualify the entrant prior to the auction ("pre-qualification"); or delay qualification screening until after the auction ("post-qualification"). Both approaches are used in practice; for example, Beall et al. (2003) discusses cases where Bechtel (a large engineering firm) followed a pre-qualification approach, whereas Kulp and Randall (2005) discusses how a pharmaceutical company procuring industrial chemicals allowed bids by entrants whose qualifications had not yet been verified. Both approaches have their respective advantages. Under post-qualification the buyer attempts to screen entrants only if their eventual bid is sufficiently attractive. This allows the buyer to directly hold an auction and saves money that might have otherwise been wasted performing qualification screening on an entrant whose bid turns out not to be competitive relative to the incumbent's bid. On the other hand, if an auction occurs under pre-qualification, the buyer commits to awarding the contract to the lowest bidder, which can push the incumbent supplier to bid more aggressively.
Under post-qualification, the entrant supplier might win the auction but fail qualification screening afterwards, forcing the buyer to award the contract to the incumbent supplier (who lost the auction), paying a higher bid price. Standard auctions assume that the bid-taker commits to awarding the contract to the bidder who submitted the best bid, and most of the existing theoretical models of auctions also make this assumption, as do laboratory experiments that test these standard models. In contrast, procurement auctions in practice are oftentimes buyer-determined (such as with post-qualification), meaning that the buyer reserves the right to select the winner after the auction (see for example Jap 2002) , so a supplier may lose the auction but win the contract.
Buyer-determined, non-binding auctions have not yet been extensively studied (two exceptions, that the incumbent, in seeking to retain a large profit, is more likely to drop out of the auction early when the reserve price is large; thus, high profit potential for the incumbent may, ironically, lead him to short-circuit the auction rather than compete harder to retain the contract. Our theory also predicts that the incumbent may bid less aggressively in response to a higher probability that the entrant would survive qualification screening, meaning that when the incumbent can lose the auction but win the contract, a tougher competitor -namely an entrant that is more likely to be qualified -might actually forestall competition. In spite of the fact that post-qualification can cause the incumbent to hold back on bidding, our theory predicts that the buyer's decision follows a threshold: If the cost of qualifying the entrant is large enough, the buyer prefers the post-qualification strategy, addressing research question 3.
To test our theory's detailed predictions in a controlled environment (research question 4 ), we employ laboratory experiments in which human subjects play the role of the incumbent supplier, the buyer, or both. 1 Consistent with theory, incumbent suppliers tend to drop out of the auction early in an attempt to preserve their profit margin when their costs are high, and bid to win the auction when their costs are low. We also find strong support in the data for how problem parameters qualitatively affect incumbent bidding. While incumbent suppliers overall bid more aggressively than the theory predicts, in a simplified setting they learn, over time, to bid closer to theoretical guidelines. Buyers, when faced with automated suppliers programmed to bid optimally, learn to time the qualification screening to minimize their total expected cost, matching the theory. But when buyers deal with human incumbents, the overly-aggressive human incumbent bidding makes post-auction qualification screening even more attractive, and consequently buyers tend to select it more often. Our main behavioral conclusion is that incumbents tend to bid more aggressively than the theory predicts, but the theory's qualitative predictions stand up well. The managerial implication is that post-auction qualification screening may even be more attractive in practice than predicted by theory alone.
The next section reviews related literature, followed by a discussion of the model in Section 3.
Section 4 provides theoretical analyses, and Sections 5 and 6 describe our experimental design and results, respectively. Section 7 concludes. Elmaghraby (2000) provides a detailed review of procurement work in the operations and economics literature. Many such papers, including ours, apply auctions as the means of price discovery during the procurement process. Krishna (2002) provides excellent treatments and references on auctions.
Literature Review
Our paper studies how supplier qualification screening manifests itself in the auction bidding behavior of entrants and incumbents. While supplier qualification is common in practice, surpris-ingly little has been written about it in the procurement auction literature. To our knowledge, only one other paper studies supplier qualification in the context of procurement auctions. That paper, Wan and Beil (2009) , focuses on the buyer's optimal mechanism design problem for a setting with an unconstrained number of bidders whose qualification probabilities and costs are ex ante symmetric. Optimal mechanism design searches among all possible mechanisms and finds the one that maximizes the objective function of the designer. Bidder incentives are captured as constraints on an optimization problem, whose solution provides a theoretical benchmark. In the present paper our focus is different. We study a setting with two suppliers, an incumbent and entrant, who are ex ante asymmetric in cost and qualification probability. For this setting we focus on theoretical and experimental results. We do so for the reverse open-descending, price-only auction, where our reasons for examining this mechanism are twofold: First, reverse open-descending, price-only auctions are commonly used for procurement in practice, making it important to study such mechanisms.
Second, the simplicity and practicality which make such mechanisms widely used in practice also make them amenable to study in the lab, a major purpose of the present paper.
In addition to providing the first equilibrium analyses for bidding behavior in reverse opendescending, price-only auctions with possibly unqualified bidders, in testing these predictions in the lab the present paper also is the first experimental study of auctions with possibly unqualified bidders. Laboratory experiments testing various aspects of auction theory go back to the early 1980's. Most early work focused on testing revenue equivalence among various auction formats and exploring possible explanations for its failure, as well as on investigating the winner's curse in common value auctions (see Kagel 1995 for a review of experimental auctions work prior to 1995 and Kagel and Levin 2002 for a review of lab experiments in the common and affiliated value settings). Experimental work on procurement auctions focused on settings where price is not the only attribute of interest (our paper falls into this category). Bichler (2000) was the first to test multi-attribute auctions in the laboratory. Chen-Ritzo et al. (2005) compare a multi-attribute procurement auction to a price-only auction and demonstrate that a multi-attribute auction can be more efficient. study a setting where suppliers have nonprice attributes but the auction is conducted on price, and explain when the buyer is better off committing to award the contract on price alone, ignoring the non-price attributes. We analyze a different (and essential) non-price attribute, supplier qualification, where the buyer seeks to award the contract to the lowest-priced qualified supplier.
In the present paper, the incumbent, who is known to the buyer, has already passed qualification screening. The entrant, who is unknown to the buyer, has not yet been qualified. There is other theoretical work that model different features that make incumbent and entrant suppliers unalike. Zhou (2003) models informational differences between incumbents and entrants when the cost of the contract is highly uncertain, finding that the incumbent generally bids aggressively owing to its informational advantage. In contrast, we find that the incumbent's qualification "advantage" in our setting can cause it to bid much less aggressively. More generically, incumbent or entrant status can motivate studying auctions where bidders possess asymmetric cost distributions; for a review of this work, see Chapter 8 of Krishna (2002) . In our analysis, in addition to the asymmetry over qualification, we allow the incumbent and entrant costs to follow different distributions.
A handful of papers have empirically studied incumbent and entrant bidding in auctions. Zhong (2007) examines incumbent and entrant behavior in multi-item procurement auctions held by a large high-tech company. Consistent with our model and experimental findings, her empirical data suggests incumbents seem to choose between timid testing and all-out competing for the contract, and that incumbents often win the contract without being the lowest bidder. De Silva et al. (2003) study sealed bids for road construction contracts for which all bidders are pre-qualified and the low bid always wins the contract. Finding that entrants bid more aggressively and win the auction with lower bids than incumbents, they explain this with a theoretical model in which entrants have more dispersed costs. Our model also predicts that entrants bid more aggressively than incumbents, but because the incumbent strategically holds back on bidding.
Model
We consider a procurement manager, or buyer, who seeks to award a single, indivisible contract for goods or services. The buyer already has a pre-existing incumbent supplier, denoted by i, who currently performs the contract. As is common in practice, we assume that the contract covers a finite period of time (e.g., one to two years), after which point it must be renegotiated. To this end we assume that the buyer becomes aware of an entrant, denoted by e, a new supplier who approaches the buyer seeking out new business. The buyer is interested in leveraging supply-side competition for the contract by conducting an auction in which she solicits competing bids from both the incumbent and the entrant. We let R denote the price the incumbent currently charges the buyer for the contract; thus, the incumbent's true cost to perform the contract, denoted by x i , is assumed to be at most R. We assume that x i is distributed according to a c.d.f. F i (with p.d.f. R] where l < 1 ≤ R, and that the entrant's true cost x e follows a c.d.f F e (with p.d.f. f e > 0) over [0, 1] . We assume that Fe fe is increasing, 2 x i and x e are privately-known and independently-distributed, and the distributions F i and F e are common knowledge.
We assume that both suppliers seek to maximize their expected utility. We let U (·) denote the incumbent's utility function. Thus, the utility of an incumbent with true cost x i is U (p − x i ) if he wins the contract and receives payment p from the buyer, or is U (0) if he does not win the contract. We assume that U (·) is concave, i.e., the incumbent is risk-neutral or risk-averse. In our model setting, the entrant will have a dominant bidding strategy (see §4); thus, we do not explicitly specify the entrant's utility function. Our theoretical analyses of the suppliers' bidding behavior utilizes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium concept, which is standard in the auction literature.
Due to its incumbency status, the incumbent is already qualified for the contract; due to opaque requirements 3 set by the buyer, we assume that both the buyer and the suppliers only know that the probability that the entrant is indeed qualified equals 0 < β < 1, the entrant's qualification probability. For instance, β close to one corresponds to very light qualification checks that any entrant supplier is very likely to pass, while β close to zero corresponds to very strict qualification requirements that relatively few entrant suppliers would be able to pass. 4 Qualification screening checks can be costly, involving tests of supplier products, trips to the supplier's production facilities, etc. We let K ≥ 0 denote the qualification cost, that is, the cost that would be incurred by the buyer to verify whether the entrant is, or is not, qualified for the contract.
The buyer seeks to minimize her expected total procurement cost, that is, the contract price plus any supplier qualification costs. If the buyer holds an auction in which the entrant and incumbent compete, bidding occurs via a typical reverse clock auction (see Ausubel and Cramton 2006 for discussions about clock auctions in practice). In a clock auction, the calling price begins at an initial price, and then falls continuously until one of the two bidders drops out. The buyer faces a choice about the timing of qualification screening on the entrant: she can choose either "post-qualification" or "pre-qualification," as described next.
Post-qualification
Under post-qualification, the buyer directly conducts a price-based reverse clock auction between the entrant and incumbent, but without attempting to qualify the entrant ahead of time. For simplicity, we assume the auction kicks off with a calling price p equal to R (the reserve price) and the calling price p continuously drops as the auction progresses. The auction ends when either or both bidders drop out (ties are broken randomly). Suppose the auction ends at a calling price p = b. If it was the entrant that dropped out first, the incumbent wins the contract and gets paid b; otherwise, the buyer performs qualification screening on the entrant, and awards the contract to the entrant with a payment b − K β if the entrant passes, but contracts with the incumbent and pays 3 Some aspects of qualification are straightforward such as having three satisfied references or passing product conformance tests, but others are more ambiguous. For instance, the buyer might have their internal production and design engineers conduct face-to-face meetings with the supplier's employees, to assess the "fit" between the buyer and supplier organizations on important issues such as lean principles and quality assurance, or to verify the supplier's in-house technical expertise on the product they are to produce. See Wan and Beil (2009) . 4 The strictness of the qualification screening performed by the buyer is typically commensurate with the buyer's perceived downside risk of supplier non-performance. While the buyer might be satisfied with only light qualification screening when purchasing indirect goods or services (such as office cleaning), when purchasing a critical direct input whose conformance to precise design specifications directly impacts the safety or performance of the buyer's product, the buyer's screening checks could be quite involved.
the incumbent b if the entrant fails. 5
By subtracting
K β when computing the entrant's contract payment, the buyer accounts for the need to post-qualify the entrant. Hence the buyer essentially runs a total-cost auction: She computes the total cost bid from a supplier to be the supplier's price offer plus a markup to account for qualification expenses. This markup is assumed to be zero for the incumbent, capturing the fact that the incumbent is already qualified for the contract. For the entrant, the markup is equal to K β which accounts for the fact that prior to accepting an entrant's bid, the buyer would have to perform K dollars worth of qualification checks on the entrant, which the entrant would pass with probability β. 6 One can regard markup K β as a "switching cost" related to the need to perform costly qualification screening on the entrant. Intuitively, as the cost of qualification (K) increases or the entrant's qualification probability (β) decreases, the entrant becomes less attractive to the buyer, which is reflected by a larger markup K β . In effect, the markup shifts the entrant's cost distribution to the right, making the entrant less competitive. Because the entrant's true cost x e is distributed between zero and one, the effective cost (i.e., true cost plus the markup) of the entrant is distributed between [
Of course, additional switching costs that are unrelated to qualification -such as the need to change order processing procedures -could also be incorporated into the model by simply shifting F e to the right. We assume R > K β ; otherwise, no entrant cost type could earn a positive profit.
Pre-qualification
Under pre-qualification, the buyer pays K to screen the incumbent before the auction. With probability 1 − β, the entrant is found to be unqualified and is discarded, and without any competitive threat to the incumbent the contract is defacto renewed with the incumbent at prevailing price R. This captures a situation in which the buyer must rely on supplier competition for price concessions. However, with probability β the pre-qualification establishes that the entrant is qualified, at which point an auction is conducted between the entrant and the incumbent. The auction details are exactly as before, save the need to use post-qualification: Whichever bidder drops out first loses (ties are broken randomly), and the other wins the contract and is paid the loser's dropout bid.
5 The buyer can reasonably implement such a payment rule when she can commit to ignore renegotiation offers from suppliers after the auction. In other words, suppliers know their bids will be treated as binding. Given the auction rules, the suppliers plan accordingly. 
Theoretical Analyses

Incumbent bidding strategy under post-qualification
Standard open-descending auction analyses (e.g., Krishna 2002) conclude that a supplier who must win the auction to win the contract finds it a dominant strategy to stay in the auction until either their opponent drops out or the price drops so low that winning would be unprofitable, whichever happens first. The implication is that if the buyer chooses pre-qualification and the entrant passes pre-qualification, both suppliers would bid down to their true cost before dropping out in the ensuing auction. It also implies that under post-qualification, the entrant finds it optimal to bid down to its true effective cost (x e + K β ). However, the standard theory does not specify how the incumbent should bid under post-qualification, because then the incumbent can lose the auction but still win the contract. The following theorem characterizes the incumbent's Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding strategy under post-qualification, addressing research question 1. 
Theorem 1 Given any
In words, Theorem 1 predicts that, depending on his true cost, x i , the incumbent deploys one of three types of strategies: "boycott the auction," "bid-to-win," and "test-the-water." Under the boycott strategy, the incumbent drops out of the auction at the reserve price, and simply hopes that the entrant fails post-qualification. Part (i) predicts that this strategy is used when the incumbent knows he is unlikely to beat the entrant on price alone, i.e., when the incumbent's cost is quite high
. In such a case the incumbent thinks it will likely be pointless to try and win on price, so he short-circuits the auction by dropping out immediately. Part (ii) predicts that only when his cost is very low (x i ≤ x W ) will the incumbent deploy the bid-to-win strategy in which he lowers his bid until the entrant is forced to drop out. In fact, since x W is bounded by the lower bound on the entrant's effective cost distribution ( K β ), the incumbent only bids this aggressively when he is absolutely certain he can beat the entrant on price alone. Part (iii) predicts that when the incumbent's cost is moderate he uses a mixture of these two extreme strategies, the test-the-water strategy: He bids against the entrant in the hopes of clinching the contract on price alone, but does so only half-heartedly -if the entrant stays in the auction long enough, eventually the incumbent will abandon the effort and drop out (at price p(x i )) before reaching his true cost. Surprisingly, this structure of the incumbent's bidding strategy (Theorem 1) is predicted regardless of the particular entrant and incumbent cost distributions F e and F i and the incumbent's utility function U (of course, since the entrant has a dominant strategy, the result also applies regardless of the entrant's utility function).
The key insight here is that buyers should not assume that her incumbent suppliers will bid aggressively to retain the contract just because she pits them against an entrant in an auction. The next result predicts how the incumbent's bidding behavior changes with the underlying procurement setting, addressing research question 2.
Theorem 2 The optimal bid-down to level p(x
Thus, the probability that the incumbent wins the auction outright (i.e., p(x i 
Theorem 2 predicts that as it becomes costlier for the buyer to perform qualification screening on the entrant (as K increases), the incumbent is more likely to win the auction outright. This is because a higher qualification cost causes the buyer to add a higher "switching cost" ( K β ) to the entrant's bid, making it easier for the incumbent to beat the entrant on price and thereby encouraging the incumbent to try to win the auction. However, Theorem 2 predicts that the incumbent is more likely to drop out of the auction early when the reserve price R is large. By dropping out early and letting the entrant win the auction, the incumbent loses the contract if the entrant survives post-qualification. This risk is more worthwhile for the incumbent if there is more profit that he is trying to preserve. Thus the theory predicts that high profit potential for the incumbent may lead him to short-circuit the competition rather than compete harder to retain the contract.
Theorem 2 also predicts that the incumbent may bid more or less aggressively in response to a higher probability (β) that the entrant would survive qualification screening. As one might intuitively expect, the incumbent is encouraged to try to win the auction when the entrant is more likely to survive post-qualification. But what is perhaps less initially obvious is that the buyer is more willing to post-qualify the entrant (who is more likely to survive the post-qualification), so the "switching cost" shrinks, scaring the incumbent away from trying to compete on price. In fact, the theory predicts that when the incumbent can lose the auction but win the contract, a tougher competitor -an entrant who is more likely to be qualified -might actually forestall competition.
Buyer's optimal qualification strategy
In the previous section we saw that the buyer should be careful not to assume that suppliers will bid aggressively simply because she pits them against each other in an auction. Pre-qualification is a tool available to the buyer to try and ensure suppliers do bid aggressively. However, it is not clear whether the buyer would always prefer to use pre-qualification, as we investigate now, addressing research question 3.
In comparing the post-and pre-qualification strategies, the buyer faces the following trade-offs.
If she uses post-qualification, she avoids wasting money qualifying an entrant whose price in the auction might not turn out to be competitive, and also avoids losing the opportunity to run an auction in case the entrant is actually unqualified. However, post-qualification causes the incumbent to hold back on bidding in the auction. Pre-qualification can induce more aggressive bidding by the incumbent, but pre-qualification backfires on the buyer if the entrant fails pre-qualification and must be discarded. Thus, the buyer's decision depends on how the incumbent will bid in an auction with post-qualification. If the buyer thinks the incumbent will bid very aggressively even if the entrant might be unqualified, post-qualification can be an attractive strategy. On the other hand, if the incumbent will only bid aggressively if the buyer can tout the fact that the entrant is fully qualified and only the low bid will win the contract, the buyer may be forced to use pre-qualification.
As discussed in §3, under the pre-qualification strategy, the buyer spends qualification cost K on qualifying the entrant, which yields one of two outcomes: With probability β the entrant is found to be qualified and an auction is subsequently run with two fully qualified bidders, thus resulting in an expected contract payment of E max{x i , x e } (recall that x i ≤ R); and with probability 1 − β the entrant is found to be unqualified and is discarded, and consequently the contract is renewed with the incumbent at price R. In summary, under pre-qualification the buyer's expected total (payment plus qualification) cost is
( 1 )
Per Theorem 1, if the buyer uses the post-qualification strategy, the incumbent's bidding strategy can be described as a bid-down-to level p(x i ). The entrant wins the auction if p(x i ) > min{x e + K β , R}; if so, the buyer incurs a qualification cost K to vet the entrant and pays p(
to the entrant if the entrant survives post-qualification (which happens with probability β), but pays p(x i ) to the incumbent if the entrant fails post-qualification (which happens with probability
, R}, the incumbent wins the auction, and thus keeps the contract with a payment from the buyer equal to either the entrant's dropout bid or the reserve price (whichever is smaller), min{x e + K β , R}. Therefore, under the post-qualification strategy, the buyer's expected total cost is
The buyer finds the optimal qualification strategy by comparing (1) with (2). The next proposition proves the buyer prefers post-qualification screening if the qualification cost K is large enough.
Theorem 3 Given any
F i , F e , U (·), β ∈ (0, 1
), l and R, there exists a threshold K such that it is optimal for the buyer to choose post-qualification if K > K.
When the qualification cost is high enough, post-qualification screening is preferred because it helps the buyer avoid wasting money qualifying an entrant whose price in the auction might not turn out to be competitive. Although Theorem 3 predicts that the buyer's optimal strategy can be characterized by a threshold over qualification cost, there in general does not exist a similar threshold over qualification probability β; for example, a buyer can prefer post-qualification either when β is small enough or large enough, as we will show in §4.3. This is because the incumbent's optimal bidding behavior under post-qualification is in general not monotone in β (Theorem 2).
Theoretical predictions under uniform costs and risk-neutrality
Research question 4 asks to what extent the theory developed in this paper predicts subjects' behavior in laboratory experiments. These lab experiments will be discussed in §5. To facilitate that analysis, the present subsection provides specific predictions for the setting studied in the laboratory. In particular, while our analytical results assumed general entrant and incumbent cost distributions, for simplicity the lab experiments utilize uniform distributions. Thus, in this subsection we derive the incumbent's optimal bidding strategy when facing an entrant whose costs are uniformly distributed. Likewise, we also find the buyer's optimal decision between pre-and postqualification when suppliers' costs are uniformly distributed. For simplicity, and as is common in the experimental auctions literature, our theoretical benchmarks employ the risk-neutral incumbent supplier model; that is, the theoretical results in this subsection are derived for linear U (·). In this subsection we call our results "propositions" (rather than theorems) to highlight the fact that they invoke the uniform distribution and linear utility assumptions which were not used in the general results earlier in the section.
Incumbent's optimal bidding function. For given K, β, and R, definex(K, β, R) to be the x i ∈ (−∞,
The thresholds x B and x W depend on R, K, and 7 Note thatx(K, β, R) is well-defined because the right hand side of the equation is continuous and convex on (−∞,
and goes to positive infinity as xi goes to negative infinity. β and are provided in the following table.
Proposition 1 illustrates Theorem 1 by presenting closed-form expressions for the incumbent's optimal bidding function (bid-down-to level). Figure 1 plots this bidding function for the problem parameters used in our laboratory experiment.
Sensitivity of bidding behavior to problem parameters.
A useful measure of the aggressiveness of the bidding behavior is the percentage of auctions incumbents win outright (as opposed to being awarded the contract after the entrant wins the auction but fails the qualification screening). Theorem 2 predicts that the probability of the incumbent winning the auction outright increases in the qualification cost K. The exact bidding functions furnished by Proposition 1 enable us to further predict qualitative effects of the entrant's qualification probability β on the aggressiveness of the incumbent's bidding behavior.
Proposition 2 Assume F e ∼ U [0, 1] and the incumbent is risk-neutral. The probability that the incumbent wins the auction outright is increasing in β if K is close to zero, and decreasing in β if
K is large and close to βR. [10, 110] , and that the incumbent is risk-neutral.
Proposition 2 predicts that β's effect on the incumbent's probability of winning the auction depends on the size of K. The intuition is that when K is small, the "switching cost" K β imposed on the entrant's bids is modest, and larger β scares the incumbent into bidding more aggressively to avoid losing the contract. However, when K is large, the switching cost imposed on the entrant is so significant that it becomes easy for the incumbent to clinch the contract by winning the auction.
In such cases, larger β diminishes this switching cost and the incumbent bids less aggressively, anticipating that to win the auction he would have to sacrifice too much potential profit. Figure 2 shows the buyer's optimal decision for various qualification cost and probability pairs, (K, β). The hill-shaped line divides the plane: In the upper region the buyer finds it optimal to choose the post-qualification strategy, and in the lower region the buyer finds it optimal to use the pre-qualification strategy. Confirming Theorem 3, the buyer prefers pre-qualification only when the qualification cost K is relatively small (making prequalification cheap). Additionally, the figure illustrates that the size of the qualification probability β has a non-monotone effect on the buyer's decision: The buyer prefers pre-qualification when β is neither too small (in which case pre-qualification is very likely to disqualify the bidder), nor too large (in which case the incumbent is inclined to bid aggressively even under post-qualification because he knows the entrant would stand only a small chance of failing post-qualification).
Illustration of buyer's optimal decision.
Experimental Design and Research Hypotheses
Experimental design
We designed our experiments to test the research hypotheses in a way that gives the theory the best shot to work by simplifying the decision task for the participants and promoting learning. With this goal in mind, we start by analyzing the behavior of incumbent suppliers and buyers separately.
In all our laboratory settings, an incumbent supplier competes with an entrant for the right to provide a contract to the buyer. The entrant has a dominant strategy to bid truthfully, so we automated the entrant to bid according to this dominant strategy in all experiments. The incumbent's cost of providing the contract is U [10, 110] and the entrant's cost is U [0, 100]. Both costs are rounded to the nearest integer. In our treatments we vary two factors at two levels. The buyer's cost of qualifying the entrant (K) is either low (2) or high (20), and the probability that the entrant will be qualified successfully (β) is either high (70%) or low (30%). In all treatments we set the reserve R = 110 at the top of the incumbent's cost distribution support. Under post-auction qualification screening the entrant's effective cost is increased by K/β, making the effective cost It turns out that, for the four parameter configurations in our experiments, the benefit from the intermediate strategy (bidding between R and x i ) is quite small relative to the benefit from selecting the "right" extreme strategy (either boycott or bid-to-win). Figure 3 shows the benefit (measured in experimental currency units (ECU)) from boycotting relative to bidding to win. The benefit ranges from about plus or minus 25 ECU. In contrast, the benefit from using the intermediate (optimal) strategy relative to the better of the two extreme strategies is at most around 2 ECU in the β = 0.7 condition (we omit the plot verifying this to save space), and is always 0 for both treatments in the β = 0.3 condition (as can be seen from Figure 1(b) , one of the extreme strategies is always optimal in that setting).
Keeping in mind the complexity of the incumbent's decision, we tested incumbents' bidding behavior in two parts. We designed the first experiment (called the Incumbent Restricted experiment) to test the extent to which suppliers are able to learn to recognize which of the two extreme strategies is better given a constant cost x i . In this restricted setting, incumbents' cost could be either low x i = 10 or high x i = 70, and their bidding strategy was restricted to the two extremes:
to either bid the reserve (b = R = 110) or to compete fully (b = x i ). In each session we kept the same K (either 2 or 20) and varied β within subjects. Each incumbent completed 50 rounds with β = 0.3 and 50 rounds with β = 0.7 (half of the participants had the high β first, and the rest had We designed the second experiment (called the Incumbent Full experiment) to learn how incumbents bid in a more natural environment. In this experiment we kept the same β for the entire session and varied K after 50 rounds, but each round the incumbent received a new independent random draw of x i ∼ U [10, 110] , and was allowed to place any integer bid between x i and R = 110.
We designed the third experiment (called the Buyer experiment) to test how human buyers select the timing of the auction qualification screening when faced with an automated incumbent and entrant, both programmed to bid optimally. In this experiment human subjects were in the buyer role, and completed 50 rounds. Buyers received a fixed revenue each round, which we set to be 120 + K. Computerized suppliers received new independently-drawn costs each round, 10, 110] for the incumbent and x e ∼ U [0, 100] for the entrant. The buyer had to decide on the pre-or post-auction qualification screening at the beginning of the round. If the buyer chose the pre-auction qualification screening, the entrant was either successfully qualified (with probability β)
or not (with probability 1−β). If the entrant failed the screening, the round ended with the contract price of 110 and the buyer earned 10 (= 120 + K − K − 110). If the entrant passed the screening, an auction was conducted in which the losing supplier bid down to his cost, the auction ended at price P = max{x e , x i }, and the buyer earned 120 + K − K − P = 120 − P . If the buyer chose the postauction qualification screening, the auction was conducted immediately, and since the incumbent was programmed to bid down to p(x i ), the auction ended at price P = max{x e + K/β, p(x i )}. At this point, if the incumbent won, the round ended and the buyer earned 120 + K − P . If the entrant won, however, the qualification screening was conducted. If the entrant survived postqualification (with probability β) he won the contract and was paid P − K/β; if the entrant failed post-qualification (with probability 1 − β) the incumbent won the contract and was paid P . The buyer's average cost under post-qualification was thus 120 + K − P . We varied the β and K parameters between subjects, so each participant faced only a single K and β combination.
The fourth and last experiment (called the Buyer-Incumbent experiment) involved human players in both roles (the buyer and the incumbent supplier). Each participant kept his or her role throughout the session and was randomly matched each round with another human participant with a different role. Incumbents' costs were randomly drawn each round according to x i ∼ U [10, 110] and they could place any integer bid between x i and R. We conducted all experimental sessions at the Laboratory for Economic Management and Auctions (LEMA) at the Smeal College of Business, Penn State University. Our participants were students, mostly undergraduates, from a variety of majors. We recruited them through the on-line recruitment system, offering earning cash as the only incentive to participate. Upon arrival at the laboratory the subjects were seated at computer terminals. We handed out written instructions (in the Online Appendix) to them and they read the instructions on their own. After all participants finished reading the instructions, we read the instructions to them aloud, to ensure common knowledge about the rules of the game. After we finished reading the instructions to the participants we started the actual game.
In each session each participant completed a number of rounds. Each individual always had the same role (buyer or supplier) in each round. We programmed the experimental interface using 9 Experimental instructions are available from the authors upon request.
the zTree system (Fischbacher 2007) . At the end of each session we computed cash earnings for each participant by multiplying the total earnings from all rounds by a pre-determined exchange rate and adding it to a $5 participation fee. Participants were paid their earnings in private and in cash, at the end of the session.
Theoretical Benchmarks and Research Hypotheses
As we can see from Figure Table 2 ).
In the Incumbent Full treatments, however, the proportion of b = R bids is less meaningful because the number of possible bids incumbents can place is large. An alternative to b = R may be any bid between x i and R. If the optimal bid is R and the actual bid placed is slightly below R, for example, this deviation is likely to have a negligible effect on the auction outcome in terms of who wins and the resulting contract price. Therefore, when comparing different conditions in the Incumbent Full treatments we focus on metrics (2) and (3), the proportion of auctions incumbents win outright and the resulting contract prices, respectively. Table 2 shows optimal incumbent winning rates in columns 4 and 5, and contract prices in columns 6 and 7, for the Incumbent Full treatments. These optimal contract prices and winning rates are based on the actual realizations of x i and x e in the experiment. Standard deviations (in parentheses) take individual participants as the unit of analysis.
Hypothesis 1B: In the Incumbent Full treatments, average incumbent winning rates and contract
10 Winning rates are lower and contract prices are higher than they should be whenever the b = R action is taken in place of the b = xi action, and vice versa. We confirmed that this relationship is indeed what we see in the data, and do not report details in the interest of conserving space.
prices should not be different than the benchmarks in columns 4 through 7 of Table 2.
The next set of theoretical benchmarks and hypotheses follow from the predictions of Theorem 2 and Propositions 1-2 and deal with effects of K and β on the boycotting rates and contract prices. 
Hypothesis 2D: Average contract prices in the Incumbent Full treatments should decrease in K and β.
The last set of benchmarks and hypotheses deals with the buyer's behavior. In both of our buyer experiments the main metric of interest is the proportion of post-auction qualification screening decisions made. Figure 2 illustrates the buyer's optimal decisions. A secondary metric is the average total cost incurred by the buyer (contract payment plus the cost of qualification screening).
Theorem 3 shows that generally, and independently of β, there is a threshold in K such that when K is high enough, the buyer is better off always using post-auction qualification screening. 
Results
Do the theory's point predictions match the data?
To test Hypothesis 1A (point predictions for the Incumbent Restricted treatments) we compare the actual frequency of boycotting the auction to theoretical benchmarks. Table 3 shows the average boycott rates for the conditions in the restricted setting, their standard errors, and the results of hypothesis tests comparing them to theoretical benchmarks. 11 We are able to reject the Perhaps more interesting is what happens to the average boycotting rates over time, which we plot in Figure 4 . In the x i = 10 condition we find that learning is significant only in the K = 2|β = 0.7 treatment, where boycott rates decrease significantly over time. Since boycotting is not the optimal option in this condition, participants in fact learn to select the optimal option more often. In contrast, in the x i = 70 condition, boycott rates increase significantly over time in all but the K = 20|β = 0.3 condition, where they are already quite high at the start of the session. 12 Figure 4 makes it clear that to the extent there is learning, it is always in the direction consistent with the theory -participants learn to select the option that results in the higher expected profit.
Turning to Hypotheses 1B (point predictions for Incumbent Full treatments), Table 4 presents information about incumbent winning rates and contract prices. Contract prices in Table 4 give a sense of what the winning suppliers are paid on average. We first compare winning rates and contract prices to their theoretical benchmarks (Table 2 ). In the K = 2 condition winning rates are higher than they should be in theory, and in the K = 20 condition winning rates are not different from their theoretical benchmarks. Contract prices are significantly lower than the theory predicts, with the exception of the K = 20|β = 0.7 treatment. We can conclude that bidding behavior is, on Table 3 shows the results of hypothesis tests comparing the average boycott rates across Incumbent
Do the theory's qualitative predictions match the data?
Restricted conditions. The effect of x i is consistent with the theory, supporting Hypothesis 1A:
Boycott rates are the same when x i = 10 as when x i = 70 in the β = 0.3|K = 2 condition, but in the other three cases boycott rates are significantly higher when x i = 70 than they are when
Turning to Hypothesis 2A, we do observe the shifts in the boycott rates that we should observe (the effect of K when β = 0.3 and x i = 10 and the effect of β when K = 2 and x i = 10) but the behavior appears more sensitive to K and β than our theory predicts; we observe several shifts in the boycott rates that are not predicted by our model (e.g., the boycott rates decrease in K when x i = 70 and β = 0.7). These shifts in the bidding strategies can be traced to the magnitude of the strategies' profit differences; if subjects learn to select the more profitable strategy over time, based on the relative profitability of the different options they face, it is reasonable to assume that subjects learn faster to follow strategies when the benefit from doing so is large. (Refer to Figure 3 for the strategies' profit differences.) Overall, we find support for the trends that are predicted by Hypothesis 2A, and to the extent that unpredicted trends are also observed they all coincide with subjects finding the optimal decision more readily when the profit gain from doing so is larger.
Turning to the Incumbent Full treatments, Table 4 present results of hypotheses tests pertinent to Hypotheses 2B and 2C; we find support for both. Consistent with predictions of Hypothesis 2B, incumbent winning rates are higher when K = 20 than when K = 2 for both levels of β. Consistent with predictions of Hypothesis 2C, the incumbent's winning rates are higher when β = 0.7 than Turning to Hypothesis 2D, contract prices are significantly higher when β = 0.3 than when β = 0.7 for both levels of K, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2D. For the β =0.3 condition contract prices under K = 2 are higher than under K = 20, which is again consistent with Hypothesis 2D. In the β = 0.7 condition, however, there is no statistically significant difference between contract prices for K = 2 and K = 20 which is contrary to Hypothesis 2D, which says that K = 2 prices should be higher than K = 20 prices. We present a more formal analysis by fitting a logit model, with the dependent variable that is 1 when the pre-auction qualification screening is selected, and 0 when the post-auction qualification screening is selected. The dependent variables are listed in Table 5 : Logit estimates of the buyer behavior; the dependent variable is 1 if pre-auction qualification screening was selected, and 0 if post-auction qualification screening was selected.
Do buyers behave as predicted when facing automated incumbents?
condition and 0 otherwise, and Round is simply the decision number 1 to 50.
This logit model tells the same story as Figure 5 . In the β = 0.7 condition, buyers behave the same way for both levels of K at the start of the session, as evidenced by the insignificant Overall, we conclude that buyers, when faced with suppliers who consistently behave in a way that adheres to our model, also learn to behave consistently with our model's predictions; we find support for Hypothesis 3A.
Do buyers behave as predicted when facing human incumbents?
The Buyer-Incumbent experiment involves both human players, and we use it to test Hypothesis 3B.
Participants played for multiple rounds but were in the same role, either the buyer or the incumbent supplier, for the entire session. We conducted this experiment in the β = 0.7|K = 2 setting only because that is the setting that was most challenging for incumbents (due to a complicated optimal bidding function) as well as buyers (due to the difficulty in responding to the complexity that resulted from the incumbents' complicated bidding function). We first analyze the behavior of human buyers. Figure 6 shows the proportion of buyers who selected the pre-auction qualification screening each round. 14 The figure also shows the same data from the β = 0.7|K = 2 condition with automated incumbents.
When incumbents bid optimally, buyers maximize their expected profits in the β = 0.7|K = 2 condition by using the pre-auction qualification screening, and we have already observed that when incumbent suppliers are automated, buyers learn, over time, to make this decision. However, in the treatments with human incumbents, the learning trend is the opposite: Over time, buyers learn to use the post-auction qualification screening. A logit model similar in structure to the models in Table 5 confirms what we clearly see in Figure 6 . 15 The data clearly rejects Hypothesis 3B -when they deal with human incumbents, buyer behavior is different from what it is with automated incumbents.
To better understand the reasons for the different buyer behavior when faced with human vs.
automated incumbents, we analyze the behavior of the human incumbents. For this purpose, it is useful to examine the total cost that buyers incur. Table 6 summarizes the average total costs borne by the buyer (payment to supplier plus any qualification screening cost) under the pre-and post-qualification screening strategies, for human and automated incumbents, their standard errors, 14 Since each decision in the experiment with both human players took longer than each decision with automated incumbents, the all-human experiment lasted for 40 instead of 50 rounds. The figure shows all 40 rounds of the all-human experiment and the last 40 rounds of the experiment with automated incumbents.
15 The dependent variable in the logit model is 1 if the pre-auction qualification screening is selected. The independent variables are as follows: the human incumbent indicator variable, which is not significant; the interaction variable between the human incumbent indication variable and round, which is negative and significant; and the interaction variable between the automated supplier and round, which is positive and significant. Table 6 : Buyers' average total (payment plus qualification screening) cost, standard errors in parentheses, β = 0.7|K = 2.
and the results of hypothesis tests comparing average total costs.
The key observation is that while the buyer's average total cost under the pre-auction qualification screening strategy is not significantly different for human and automated incumbents (in other words, human incumbents' bidding behavior results in essentially the same buyer costs as the optimal incumbent behavior) the buyer's average total cost under the post-auction qualification screening is significantly lower with human incumbents than with automated incumbents (this is another piece of evidence against part of Hypothesis 1B). That is, human incumbents bid more aggressively than the optimal bidding strategy dictates. We already made the same observation when testing Hypothesis 1B in our analysis of human incumbent behavior under the post-auction qualification screening when faced with automated buyers (the Incumbent Full treatments) -average contract prices were consistently lower than they should have been in theory. These differences in suppliers' bidding behavior explain buyer behavior. When incumbents are automated, pre-auction qualification screening results in significantly higher profits, so buyers learn to use it. When incumbents are human, pre-auction qualification screening results in profits that are only slightly higher than profits from the post-auction qualification screening (and differences are only weakly significant), so there is no reason to expect buyers to strongly prefer one decision over the other.
Discussion of Experimental Results
We summarize our experimental results specifically as they pertain to our three research hypotheses.
The relationship between cost x i and bid is approximately consistent with the form of the optimal bid function -incumbents tend to boycott auctions when their costs are high and they tend to compete to win when their costs are low. They also learn to follow the optimal strategy better over time. Those findings support Hypothesis 1. However, our paper's main behavioral conclusion is that, contrary to Hypothesis 1, incumbents generally bid more aggressively than they should. We observe this overly aggressive behavior in the Incumbent Full setting, where incumbents tend to win more often than they should in theory, and contract prices tend to be lower than they should.
Overly-aggressive bidding is a well-known result in auction experiments, where it has been documented that bidders in sealed-bid first-price auctions with independent private values tend to bid above the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium (see Kagel 1995 for a thorough review). Exact reasons for the overly-aggressive bidding in sealed-bid first-price auctions are not well understood. One longstanding explanation that has been offered is risk aversion (Cox, Smith and Walker 1988) but several studies report results that run counter to the risk aversion explanation (Kagel and Levin 1993 , Isaac and James 2000 , Englebrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2009 . Another explanation that seems to fit a wider range of settings is bidder aversion to regret (Feliz-Ozbay and Ozbay 2007 , EngelbrechtWiggans and Katok 2007 , 2008 . While determining the exact reasons for overly-aggressive bidding is beyond the scope of our paper, we note that it is tenable that we would observe such behavior in our setting because the incumbent's problem under the post-auction qualification screening has the flavor of a sealed-bid auction, and consequently, overly aggressive bidding in our setting is likely due to the same reasons as overly aggressive bidding in sealed-bid first-price auctions. In spite of the overly-aggressive bidding by the incumbents, we find that qualitatively our theory works well; generally all parts of Hypotheses 2 are supported.
The buyer behavior is consistent with Hypothesis 3A -buyers tend to select pre-auction qualification screening when K = 2 and post-auction qualification screening when K = 20, and both of these tendencies are independent of β. We also find an interesting interaction between overlyaggressively bidding by incumbents and the decision to use post-auction qualification screening by the buyers. In a setting with K = 2|β = 0.7 buyers should select pre-auction qualification screening, and indeed, when incumbents are automated and programmed to bid optimally, buyers learn to do this. However, when incumbents are human, they bid more aggressively than they should under post-auction qualification screening, while under the pre-auction qualification screening they bid close to what the theory predicts. This causes post-auction qualification screening to be more attractive to buyers, and consequently the buyers (when facing human incumbents) tend to choose post-auction qualification screening more than they should.
Conclusions
Buyers often wish to leverage entrant suppliers against incumbent suppliers in order to reduce spend.
However, incumbent suppliers might be reluctant -or even unwilling -to bid aggressively against an entrant if they suspect that the entrant is possibly unqualified for the contract. We analyze this with a two-pronged approach. First we model this phenomenon in the context of an open-descending price-only supply auction (which are commonly used in practice) and derive the incumbent's optimal bidding strategy. Next, we lab-test our model's theoretical predictions. In addition to providing the first equilibrium analyses for bidding behavior in reverse open-descending, price-only auctions with possibly unqualified bidders, in testing these predictions in the lab the present paper also is the first experimental study of auctions with possibly unqualified bidders.
Addressing research question 1 (incumbent's optimal bidding strategy under post-qualification),
we show that in an effort to preserve their profit margin, high-and medium-cost incumbents optimally let the entrant win the auction, sometimes even "boycotting" the auction by dropping out at the reserve price. This holds under quite general assumptions, and is strikingly different from the "bid-to-cost" strategy that would be dominant if all suppliers were fully qualified. The implication is that operational issues surrounding the auction (i.e., supplier qualification) can be as important for generating price concessions as the notion of an auction itself.
Addressing research question 2 (sensitivity of the incumbent's bidding strategy), we find that the incumbent gains an advantage and is more likely to win the auction when it is costlier for the buyer to perform post-qualification screening on the entrant. However, the incumbent is more likely to drop out of the auction early when the reserve price is large; thus, high profit potential for the incumbent may lead him to short-circuit the auction rather than compete harder to retain the contract. Our theory also predicts that the incumbent may bid more or less aggressively in response to a higher probability that the entrant would survive qualification screening, meaning that a tougher competitor -namely an entrant that is more likely to be qualified -might actually forestall competition. In spite of the fact that post-qualification can cause the incumbent to hold back on bidding, if it is very expensive to qualify the entrant, the buyer prefers using post-qualification, addressing research question 3 (buyer's preference between pre-and post-qualification).
Laboratory experiments testing our theory's predictions (research question 4 ) reveal that, consistent with our theoretical results, post-qualification does indeed cause incumbents to hold back on bidding and in general the theory's qualitative predictions (sensitivity of the incumbent's bidding strategy to contract and entrant characteristics) stand up quite well in the lab. Another important finding is that incumbents tend to bid more aggressively than theory predicts under post-qualification. A managerial implication is that this tendency may make buyers in practice more willing to go ahead an pit incumbents against possibly unqualified entrants, and indeed we found evidence of this in our experiments with human buyers and human incumbents: Human buyers reacted to overly aggressive human incumbents by choosing post-qualification more often than when they faced automated incumbents programmed to bid optimally.
Our analytical and experimental analyses were enabled by stylized modeling to capture the problem's salient features. Several avenues for future work are possible. One such avenue would include multiple entrant suppliers and multiple incumbent suppliers. While the analysis would become much more tedious due to complex information updating as the auction progresses, we suspect that our main insight would not change: Incumbents, in an attempt to retain their profit margin, would hold back on bidding to the extent that they perceive themselves as facing low-cost competitors who are likely unqualified. Since we focused this paper on the open-descending auction format, another extension would be to analyze the other format commonly used in practice, the first-price sealed-bid auction (Jap 2002) . Our main insights extend to this setting: One can show that the incumbent's best response bid function follows a threshold structure in which low-cost incumbents bid aggressively but higher-cost incumbents hold back on bidding or even boycott.
However, solving for the equilibrium bids would be much more challenging -bidder qualification issues aside, first-price sealed-bid equilibria with asymmetric bidders have been solved for just a few very special cases (see Maskin and Riley 2000) . In summary, our paper reveals the importance of supplier qualification issues in industrial procurement auctions, and has the potential to help industrial buyers make better decisions about how to include entrants in procurement auctions.
A. Proof of Theorem 1
A.1 Existence of static bid-down-to level
During the auction, the price continuously decreases and the incumbent must dynamically decide whether or not to drop out. At the outset of the auction the incumbent could make the stay in/drop out decision he would make at any price, write down this strategy and simply follow it during the auction. Doing so does not sacrifice optimality, because all the actionable information revealed during the auction is subsumed by the price of the auction. Thus, the incumbent's optimal strategy is characterized by a static bid-down-to level chosen at the outset of the auction. Existence of an optimal bid-down-to level is guaranteed because the incumbent optimizes a continuous objective function over a compact set. In particular, the static optimal bid-down-to level p(x i ) is such that
Π(t), where
The decision set is t ∈ [max{x i , K β }, R] because the auction price can never be outside the set [
, R] and bidding below the true cost x i can never be profitable for the incumbent. In the incumbent's expected utility as a function of the chosen bid-down-to level t, Π(t), the first term 
A.2 Existence of thresholds x W and x B
First, we prove that p(x i ) increases in x i ; next, we show the existence and uniqueness of x B and
Monotonicity of p(x i ). Note that
which strictly increases in x i (i.e., we have
we have that p(x i ) increases in x i and, moreover, strictly increases when max{x i ,
To see this, suppose p(x i ) does not increase in x i ; then there must exist x 
On the other hand, we notice that
where the inequality holds because p(x
i ) and
. However, (5) contradicts (6), which implies that p(x i ) must increase in x i . Moreover, if max{x
Existence and uniqueness of x B . Given any
which has the following two implications.
Implication 2: There exists some δ R > 0 such that
To see Implication 2 is true, note that, for any δ > 0, for all x i ∈ (R − δ, R) and all t ∈ [x i , R), equation (4) and the fact that U (·) decreases together imply that
Implication 2 and the fact that p(x i ) is increasing together imply that there exists a unique
Existence and uniqueness of x W . The fact that U (·) is concave implies that
increases and goes to infinity as x i decreases and goes to negative infinity, which in turn implies that (per (4)) there exists some δ W > −∞ such that 
Property of p(x
i ) for x W < x i < x B . When x W < x i < x B , we have K β < p(x i ) < R,< x i ≤ K β (when x W < K β ) because p(x i ) > K β ≥ x i . Finally, that p(x i ) strictly increases when x W < x i < x B because we have proved that p(x i ) strictly increases when max{x i , K β } < p(x i ) < R.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Effect of R. Consider any R 1 < R 2 and any t 1 < t 2 < R 1 . For a given x i , when R = R 1 we have
dt dt, which does not change as R 1 increases because
dt does not change with R per (4). This implies that the optimal bid-down-to levels when R = R 1 and R 2 , denoted
Namely, the optimal bid-down-to level increases in R. • When 1 2 < β < 1, the concavity of Π(t) implies that p(x i ) = max{ 
Effect of K. We prove it by showing that i) p(x
E. Proof of Proposition 2
The probability that the incumbent wins the auction outright equals
We first consider the case with K = 0.
• When 0 < β ≤ , which is positive. Thus, the winning probability increases in β.
• When β R. Thus, the winning probability increases in β.
• When 1 2 < β < 1, R ≤ 1 and l > x B , P rob x e + K β ≤ p(x i ) equals R. It is constant as β changes.
• When 1 2 < β < 1, R > 1, x B ≤ 0, the winning probability equals max{x B − l, 0} > 0.
• When per Proposition 1. Hence, the probability increases in β.
• When 1 2 < β < 1, R > 1, x B > 0 and l > x B , the winning probability equals zero. Thus, the winning probability is constant in β.
We next consider the winning probability as K approaches βR.
• When 0 < β ≤ • When 1 R−l , which is positive if K is close enough to βR. Thus, the winning probability decreases in β as K approaches βR.
